INTRODUCTION
The National Security Strategy (NSS) reflects the nation's values and interests. 1 President George W. Bush has outlined eight key elements within NSS. The eighth element directs the transformation of America's national security institutions to meet emerging challenges and opportunities. 2 Today, the United States (US) military is facing decreasing budgets, asymmetric threats, increased operations tempo, advances in technology for friend and foe, and the dawn of the Information Age while still required to maintain the ability to operate across the full military spectrum. The Air Force (AF) is meeting this challenge through the transformation process. The AF defines transformation as a process by which the military achieves and maintains advantage through changes in operational concepts, organizational structure, and/or technologies that significantly improve warfighting capabilities or ability to meet the demand of a changing security environment. 3 One key strategic tenet of the Department of Defense's Quadrennial Defense Review is the development of a capabilities-based approach. 4 A capabilities-based approach focuses more on how the US can defeat a broad array of capabilities that any adversary may employ rather than who the adversaries are and where they may engage joint forces or US interests.
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The capabilities-based approach for the USAF requires a command and control (C2) system that can maximize the employment of air and space power capabilities at any place, at any time.
The Air Operations Center (AOC) is the C2 system for the USAF. The AOC is the aerospace operations planning and execution focal point for the Joint Task Force and is where centralized planning, direction, control, and coordination of aerospace operations occur for which the
Commander Air Forces (COMAFFOR)/Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) has
Operational (OPCON) and/or Tactical Control (TACON) of forces provided to him to achieve the Joint Force Commander's (JFC's) objectives. 6 The primary purpose of this paper is to analyze the current direction of the AF Chief of Staff (CSAF) on the legitimacy of the AOC as a weapon system. The first step in this analysis process is to look at the evolution of the AOC and current construct as directed by the CSAF.
The manning and training for the AOC is the focus of this research. Additionally, this paper will address any issues or concerns in the development of the AOC as a weapon system. Finally, the analysis will provide an overall assessment and recommendation to determine if the AOC, as a weapon system, meets the demands of a capabilities-based approach in the 21 st century.
BACKGROUND
Joint Publication 1-02 defines a command and control system as the "facilities, equipment, communications, procedures, and personnel essential to a commander for planning, directing, and controlling operations of assigned forces pursuant to the missions assigned." An USAF C2
weapon system includes; sensors, data processors, decision tools, operators, maintainers, and the interconnecting communications to enable commanders to conduct operations with unity of command and effort. 7 To meet the demand for C2 of air and space forces the USAF has developed the AOC. This has been an evolutionary process over the past sixty years. This section will address the historical path leading to the current AOC structure, the current AOC construct, and USAF guidance towards developing the AOC into a weapon system.
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES OF COMMAND AND CONTROL
The ability to command and control air and space forces has an origin dating back to the 9 In July 1943, Army Field Manual 100-20 addressed the issue of air power: "The inherent flexibility of air power is its greatest asset. This flexibility make it possible to employ the whole weight of the available air power against selected areas in turn; such concentrated use of the air striking force is a battle winning factor of the first importance. Control of available air power must be centralized and command must be exercised through the AF Commander if this inherent flexibility and ability to deliver a decisive blow are to be fully exploited." 10 Furthermore, Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the USAF worked to remedy the decentralized C2 seen in previous wars. The USAF remedied this situation by developing key tenets of airpower. The cornerstone of these tenets is centralized control and decentralized execution. The TACS remains in place today and is part of the overall JFC's C2 structure known as the Theater Air
Ground System. The TACC evolved into the AOC and gained prominence during OPERATION Desert Storm. The air and space power tenet of centralized control and decentralized execution was instrumental in the generation of 2,000-3,000 sorties a day during the first Gulf War. The JFC's intent for employment of airpower was centrally planned, distributed in the form of an air tasking order (ATO), and executed across an entire theater battlespace. 15 Moreover, all air assets were placed under the command of a single airman-the JFACC. The JFACC synchronized 2,400 coalition aircraft over 20 airfields and 6 naval carriers. 16 This C2 structure is now the cornerstone of airpower employment as illustrated during Bosnia and Kosovo, and the on-going support to OPERATION Enduring Freedom and OPERATION Iraqi Freedom.
CURRENT AOC CONSTRUCT/LOCATIONS
The AOC is a unique capability the USAF provides the Combatant Commanders. 
AOC AS A WEAPONS SYSTEM
Warfighting integration is all about providing integrated C4ISR that provides commanders and staffs with decision quality information to control forces to achieve desired effects. As our battle management command, control, communications, computers, and information concepts are the central nervous system of the future C2 Constellation; the AOC weapon system is the brain. Our Warfighting integration motto is INTEGRATE, INNOVATE, DOMINATE and our AOC weapon system is absolutely critical to this motto and future campaign success. I'm very pleased to endorse the first AOC weapon system STATREP (Status Report).
-Lt Gen Leslie Kenne, AF/XI Warfighter Integration
DEFINING A WEAPON SYSTEM
The CSAF declaring the AOC as a weapon system has raised some eyebrows among the traditional weapon systems in the operations community. Traditionally, the USAF thinks of a weapon system as a platform that can deliver fires whether air-to-air missiles or precisionguided munitions. Moreover, traditional weapon systems operate at the tactical level. The F-15E Strike Eagle is a perfect example of a traditional weapon system. The F-15E weapon system receives support and employment from USAF personnel who receive education and training on that system and obtain an AF Specialty Code (AFSC). The personnel assigned a specific AFSC must attend formal training course. This course takes place at a formal training unit (FTU). The FTU provides aircrew training in an initial qualification training (IQT) course.
Following the FTU, aircrew personnel are assigned to a combat squadron for mission qualification training (MQT), which provides training to declare them combat mission ready (CMR). Once CMR, aircrew perform continuation training (CT) to hone and perfect their warfighting skills. F-15E enlisted maintenance personnel progress in a similar fashion.
Maintenance personnel attend a formal technical school and complete on-the-job training (OJT) to obtain a given skill level needed to maintain the weapon system.
The AOC is a unique capability that provides the JFACC with a C2 structure to for centralized planning, direction, control, and coordination of air and space power to meet the objectives of the JFC. The AOC is an operational level C2 system that, in the past, was unique to different commands from the standpoint of non-standardized equipment, operating procedures, and training. As the AF transforms to meet the challenges of the 21 st century, it is important to leverage all areas of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, people, and facilities to achieve the optimum capability. The USAF working to meet this challenge is declaring the AOC as a weapon system. The biggest challenges facing the AOC as a weapon system are in the areas of standardized equipment, procedures, manning and training. USAF and other Service personnel from a variety of weapon systems and support AFSCs man the AOC. The training for AOC personnel is an addition to normal AFSC training. Personnel operate at an AOC for a single tour or provide augmentation during contingencies or exercises.
Prior to declaring the AOC a weapon system, personnel usually were assigned to an AOC with little or no training and had to learn their skills by some selected courses or OJT. Today, the USAF is developing an AOC system-training plan to meet the educational and training needs of AOC personnel known as AOC University (AOCU). 19 The goal of the AOCU is to provide a computer-based virtual training system to allow training until unit-based training suites are available.
The designation of the AOC as a weapon system could infer the assignment of a new AFSC. AF Instruction 36-2101, paragraph 3.9, states changes in mission, weapon system, or equipment may require changes to authorized AFSCs and reevaluation of training and individual qualifications. The question to ask is whether the AOC is truly a weapon system in the traditional sense requiring specific training and assignment of a new AFSC. One could argue that the complexity associated with C2 operations demands individuals be trained and assigned an AFSC. Currently, the personnel assigned to an AOC do not have a specific AOC AFSC.
Instead, the AF has determined that AOC personnel will receive a special experience identifier (SEI). SEIs identify special experience and training not otherwise identified within the personnel data system (PDS). SEIs compliment the assignment process, but are not a substitute for AFSCs. SEIs rapidly identify an already experienced resource to meet unique circumstances, contingency requirements, or management needs. 20 SEIs track information that could otherwise be lost.
The AF has two SEI codes for AOC personnel: 9A for officers and 901 for enlisted personnel. The assignment of the SEI 9A code requires:
• Either recommendation of supervisor or commander and certification as CMR according to the provision of AF Instruction (AFI) 13-1, Volume I; • Or completion of any contingency operations or air and space expeditionary force (AEF) temporary duty tour at an AOC (combined or joint) of at least 90 days;
• Or 6 months of experience while assigned to an AOC entity (combined or joint);
• Or participation in a large scale theater air operations or exercises such as Blue Flag, Roving Sands, or Joint Experimental Force Exercise (JEFX).
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The assignment of the SEI 901 code requires:
• The AF has three primary AOC manning initiatives: staff the AOC as a weapon system, modernize to reduce manning requirements and standardize new AOC organizational structure. 24 Critical to meet these challenges is the development of unit type codes (UTCs).
UTCs are the building blocks for equipment and personnel management to supply combatant commanders with necessary forces. Upon Combatant Commander request for forces, the Air and Space Expeditionary Force Center (AEFC) plans, configures, schedules and assesses aerospace expeditionary forces enabling the delivery of versatile and responsive aerospace power while providing AF personnel stability and predictability. the core cadre. However, the unique demands of AEF rotations as well as the broad spectrum of joint and coalition task forces will require the capability to integrate joint and allied/coalition personnel, unit representatives, subject matter experts, and LNOs who may not have comprehensive training opportunities (non-dedicated).
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TRAINING
Training qualified operators to augment C2 operations presents a significant challenge.
Ensuring standardized C2 training across the total force lays a sound foundation and develops the skills necessary for the employment of C2 systems. 27 The first challenge is identifying and training C2 personnel. Full employment of the weapon system remains hampered by a lack of trained personnel. In addition, augmentation personnel are required to staff AOCs, and come with varying amounts of AOC experience; the burden of training these augmentees resides with the augmented unit. 28 Currently, the rate of untrained personnel assignments to current or contingency AOCs is approximately 60%. 29 The goal of the AOC as a weapon system and formulation of UTCs is to assist this process. The goal of the AF is to staff at 100% the AOCs 
KEY ISSUES/CONCERNS
The ability to maximize, the full capability of air and space power resides in the AOC becoming weapon system. However, this paper professes the USAF must address several key issues/concerns to be fully combat ready. There are three key issues with respect to SEIs. The first key issue is how to track individuals who have attained an SEI code prior to current FTU training. As previously stated, personnel are give an SEI code of 9A (officers) or 901 (enlisted) upon completion of FTU. These individual codes can be matched to specific FTU courses to determine which functional area they are trained. However, individual SEI codes given prior to FTU training are generic and do not correspond to specific functional areas.
The second key issue is there are no procedures or guidelines established to determine when an individual is no longer mission ready or requires additional training. Additionally, no sound guidelines exist for the removal or suspension of an SEI based on experience level. For example, if an aircrew member were assigned to an AOC from 1997-1998, they would be granted an SEI. Following this assignment, they would still maintain the SEI even though they remained outside the AOC environment for an extended period. The complexity and rapid modernization of the AOC could result in this individual being unqualified for AOC duty.
However, with the current system, the unqualified individual may resume duties in an AOC based on the SEI. Normally personnel are assigned to an AOC for a single tour (1 year for a remote assignment and 2-3 years for CONUS/Overseas assignment) or during an AEF rotation or contingency operation (normally 90-179 days).
Traditional weapon systems have a limitation associated with their training programs. For example, if an F-15E aircrew member has been out to the cockpit for greater than one year they are required to attend either a refresher course or "B" course. A "B" course is a full IQT program designed for new aircrew member or an individual not in the weapon system for greater than three years. The final key SEI issue is the inability to assess qualifications based upon the SEI code itself. At first glance, an individual with an SEI code has AOC experience and can perform AOC duties. However, the SEI code is too generic to determine whether they have qualifications that are specific to a division in the AOC. This generic code will require AEFC personnel to assess each individual and determine which specific FTU course they completed prior to assignment to AEF rotations.
Another concern affects the overall strength of AOC manning. As previously stated, the core AOC UTC can direct 300 sorties per day. The AOC strength for Desert Storm and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM ranged from 1200 -2000 personnel to generate 1500-2500
sorties. The USAF, with augmentation from joint/coalition personnel, was able to meet the manning requirement for these operations. The Secretary of Defense states that the Department of Defense must swiftly defeat the efforts of two major adversaries simultaneously.
Specifically, does the AF have enough personnel trained to maintain the current and proposed AOC UTCs and provide enough non-dedicated personnel to meet more than one contingency?
Initial research concludes that this would be a monumental task given current staffing and training capability.
The most critical area for AOC manning is the availability of rated officers to fill both the 7FVX1 and 7FVX5 UTCs. The AOC weapon system is highly dependent upon rated officers to insure effective air and space power employment. Rated officers constitute approximately 50%
of the officer billets in the AOC UTCs. Overall requirements for rated officers for Headquarter level staff positions exceed current availability. The USAF groups AOC manning with
Headquarters level staff positions. The shortage stems from pilot retention and pilot production.
Headquarters staff level manning has been critical for several years operating around 58%.
Today, this number is around 76% due to navigators backfilling pilot positions. Unfortunately, 48% of the current navigator force will be eligible to retire within the next four years. This results from permanent change of station, retirement, and normal separations. Active duty units feel the affects more than the Air National Guard (ANG) or AF Reserve (AFR) units do.
ANG and AFR unit personnel remain in their respective units for extended periods, and in many cases provide continuity and experience within theater AOCs.
RECOMMENDATION
The primary reason for developing the AOC as a weapon system is to provide JFC with a cadre of CMR AOC C2 warriors capable of supporting any contingency. The USAF has the best C2 warriors and meets all mission tasks. However, this paper will conclude by providing recommendations to improve this capability by addressing the key issues/concerns and substantiate the AOC as a weapon system.
There are two options available to address the SEIs. The first option allows AOC personnel to receive a specific AFSC upon completion of training. This would allow personnel to remain with the weapon system throughout their career. Unfortunately, this option will fail in the wake of rated officer manning. By permanently assigning an AFSC, this will further reduce the already strained, manning required for combat aircraft and Headquarters staff positions.
The USAF did look at this possibility but concluded that this was not a viable option and opted for the assignment of the SEI. The only viable option is the SEI but requires modification to improve accountability and personnel qualification tracking. The SEI code should reflect actual personnel qualifications and this in turn would aid the AEFC in selecting personnel to meet AEF rotations. Table 2 The concern for rated manning has two potential actions, which may alleviate the problem. First, the USAF should continue to seek retired or separate rated officers and offer a contract to return to active duty and fill AOC rated officer billets. Secondly, the active duty UTCs currently contains only USAF personnel. A modification of the UTCs to allow joint billets would help reduce the rated manning issue. The AOC has never employed C2 of air and space power assets in isolation. During contingencies, the AOC manning consists of USAF and joint positions. This course of action will provide joint integration and prepare AOC personnel to train the way we fight-jointly. properly train and become CMR. The USAF must re-evaluate the decision to delay the procurement of training suites. These are essential to personnel upgrade and continuation training. In unattainable, the USAF will require more training slots during major exercises.
Currently, a limited amount of training slots exist thus requiring more exercises to meet the demand. Unfortunately, the current operations tempo will have a significant impact on the potential to increase the number of exercises available for training.
The final recommendation concerns continuity of AOC personnel. As previously stated, active duty personnel normally complete a single assignment to an AOC thus decreasing the expertise available to meet contingency requirements. Conversely, the ANG AOC UTCs do not have this limitation. ANG AOCs have personnel remaining in the same weapon system for years. This expertise provides CMR AOC personnel ready to meet contingency tasking with little to no additional training. Albeit not popular, the USAF could re-task one ANG UTC as a core 7FVX1. This would provide continuity and meet the challenges of two swiftly defeat requirements.
The demand of the 21 st century requires a capabilities-based approach for the all services.
The employment of air and space capabilities is dependent upon an effective and efficient C2
mechanism. The USAF is transforming our force to meet future challenges. This paper concludes that the USAF declaring the AOC as a weapon system meets transformation requirements. As with any new system, there exist barriers and potential areas for improvement. This paper agrees with the CSAF's decision to declare the AOC a weapon system and suggest consideration be given to the proposals to alleviate key issues and concern.
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